Friday, November 19, 2010

Russia And Lebanon: Expanding The Network Of Protection

By Walid Choucair
This comment was published in al-Hayat on 19/11/2010

With the announcement of the Russian military donation to Lebanon, the relations between Beirut and Moscow have likely entered a new phase, one that paves the way for strategic interests between the two countries, and for Russian interests in this small country. One might recall the notion that Lebanon is not as important to the Russian Federation as it is thought by those who are highlighting the military donation, which the Russians announced during the visit by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to Moscow. And some might believe that Moscow has decided to grant Lebanon T-72 tanks because it is replacing its armored vehicle arsenal to rely increasingly on newer-generation models, namely the T-90. Nevertheless, the Russian donation deserves some attention.

Russia has never made a donation of this size to a state outside its political and geographical orbit, although the history of international relations shows that it has engaged in debt forgiveness with certain countries. This is sufficient for us to ask about the political meaning behind the move toward Lebanon; it seems to suggest that this superpower wants to enhance its political relations with Lebanon, and that the small country is part of Russia’s concern with developing the current system of regional relations at this stage. The search for Moscow’s objectives in its relationship with Lebanon is taking on added importance, if the economic aspect of bilateral relations can be developed. Those sitting in the Kremlin believe that the economy is the basis of relations between states, and this is especially true if Moscow is concerned with seeing Lebanon avoid becoming an arena of influence for states in the region, both near and far, and does not want to see this influence become an additional reason for undermining stability in the region, along with other well-known reasons. In this regard, Moscow’s eyes are on Iranian influence, which it fears will grow on in the Mediterranean, because it is uncomfortable with Iran’s behavior with regard to the nuclear issue, and with what it sees as the Iranian role in causing the failure of Moscow’s efforts to complete a Palestinian reconciliation. Russia has sought this goal forcefully throughout this year, through efforts to facilitate peace between Palestinians and Israelis. As for Syrian influence, Russia is wagering that its good historical relations with Damascus will let it help push the latter to use this influence for preserving stability in Lebanon.

Moscow is trying to place Lebanon on the map of oil and gas pipelines that pass to and from Russia, to Europe and the Middle East, especially Turkey. It is a map of arteries that form the basis for major political interests and strategic regional projects. During the Lebanese-Russian talks a few days ago, the sides discussed including the possibility of big Russian firms gaining guarantees from the Russian government to build a number of gas-powered electricity plants in Lebanon, with Russian funding, provided that Lebanon purchase this energy from Russian companies for a period of time (30 years, for example), and see Russian gas flow through a Turkish pipeline and then connect it to the Arab pipeline, which has reached the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Russians are headed toward executing a similar project with Turkey; however, it aims at building three nuclear plants to generate electricity on its territory. This electricity will then be sold by Russian firms (which are carrying out the construction process with a guarantee from the Turkish state and the facilities it offers) to Ankara for three decades, with ownership then reverting to Turkey.

Russia’s desire for economic, military and political partnership with Lebanon might help the latter expand the network of external umbrellas that protect its domestic situation from meddling by regional or international powers, and its territory from Israeli adventurism against it. Moreover, it will make Lebanon’s obtaining of additional Russian weapons in the coming stage (negotiations are underway for Lebanon to purchase 46 T-72 tanks at special prices that are very low) possible, if it develops and includes means of protecting its skies from constant Israeli violations.

Russia’s participation in providing elements of force to the Lebanese Army, under no illusions about the balance of power with Israel, constitutes a political-military deterrent to Israeli recklessness, which can be added to Russian economic interests, if bilateral negotiations on agreements covering the electricity sector and oil drilling succeed. All of this opens new horizons that give Lebanon the ability to depend on a wider range of weapons sources, so that the United States alone does not dominate things, and so that protecting Lebanon from Israeli bullying and from regional meddling in domestic conditions becomes a meeting-point for a wider range of states with international influence.

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