Bernard Gwertzma interviewed UN's special adviser Edward C. Luck about Syria and Libya
Edward Luck
Edward Luck
Bernard Gwertzma: How important was the UN
Security Council action allowing use of force to protect civilians in Libya,
which tipped the military scales against Qaddafi?
Bernard C. Luck: I think it was quite an important precedent,
both in Resolution 1970, which talked about sanctions and referred Qaddafi and
some of his people to the International Criminal Court, and then in Resolution
1973, which talked about all necessary measures to protect populations--both of
those invoked the responsibility to protect. That resolution led to the NATO
air umbrella over Libya and the direct military action on the government
forces.
It
was important that the members of the council didn't find that to be
controversial. In other words, the principle was agreed upon. There were some
differences on how to go about it, but it was clear that a government that
seems to be virtually at war with its people, that attacks peaceful protesters
with aircraft, with advanced weaponry, with military force, with mercenaries;
clearly this is not part of normal governance. That, simply, is not acceptable.
The Russians and Chinese had some reservations. But the fact that they did not
veto shows that they have some political pressure that comes up from the sense
that publics around the world expect the Security Council to act in these kinds
of situations.
Did it help that Qaddafi himself made incendiary comments about
"killing these rats" or "cockroaches" when talking about
the opposition that had seized power in Benghazi?
Commitments
were made by the heads of state (PDF) at the World Summit in 2005, who said
that they would not only try to prevent crimes against humanity but would also
seek to prevent their incitement. That summit included important wording on
"Responsibility to Protect" which has since become known as
"R2P." So, when Qaddafi decided to characterize the protestors as
"cockroaches"--the same term that had been used vis-à-vis the Tutsis
in the Rwandan genocide [1994]--that was a very worrisome sign. It worried us
in the Secretariat; it worried the member states. There was some worry that
Qaddafi might be out of control; that he might go very far. His early attacks
on the protestors showed that he didn't seem to understand the limits of
international law and human rights. In many ways, his own behavior encouraged
the international community to take strong action.
Press reports from Tripoli say that even though the Qaddafi
government has seemingly fallen, the new transitional government is not really
in charge (NYT), and there are various tribal groupings that are claiming parts
of the country. Are you concerned that this may turn out to be an even larger civil
war?
From
a responsibility to protect perspective, we would think that any governing
authority in Tripoli would have to protect the population. To protect the
population requires some degree of control and authority throughout the
country. Obviously, in a chaotic situation, it's very hard to protect
populations. So, we would remind the newest authorities, just as we reminded
the Qaddafi government, of these responsibilities. I should say that it isn't
the goal of the responsibility to protect to change regimes. The goal is to
protect populations. It may be in some cases that the only way to protect
populations is to change the regime, but that certainly is not the goal of the
R2P per se.
In Syria, the government has not used that kind of incendiary language.
The government of President Bashar al-Assad claims they're fighting terrorists
or foreign enemies. Does that make it harder for the UN to do what it was able
to do in Libya?
Certainly,
the fact that the government in Damascus has been more careful with its
rhetoric means that the case there was not as obvious. But we at the United
Nations were very concerned since the beginning, and Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon has been very consistent on this--that the kind of violence used
against peaceful protectors was simply unacceptable. Over time, it seems that
there is reason to believe that crimes against humanity may well have been
committed there. When the Syrian government refused to allow the UN
investigators on its territory, which had been mandated by the Human Rights
Council; when it tried to cut off all media [and] Internet connections, these
were clear, worrying signs because one begins to ask what they are trying to
hide.
If
they feel what they're doing is perfectly justified, they should allow the international
community to get a better sense on the ground of what is happening. The United
Nations has wanted for a long time to send in humanitarian teams to help the
population who were suffering because of the violence. Again, the government
was very reluctant, and only recently allowed in a small team (NYT), whose
movement and independence were, in some way, compromised by government control.
It was a start, but it was not the kind of transparent situation to properly
see whether people are being protected from human rights abuses and atrocities.
Going back to Libya for a moment, why do you think that the
Russians and Chinese did not use a veto, which they have threatened to do in
the case of Syria?
I
think there are two important factors. One, as I mentioned, is that the
responsibility to protect really does have a large public following around the
world. These are standards that people expect governments to follow, and they
expect the international community, in particular the United Nations, to respond
in these kinds of situations. But the other important difference was a question
of regional pressure. There was a lot of regional pressure to act in the case
of Libya, and I know that even countries that are rather cautious about the
responsibility to protect felt that in that particular case they couldn't go
against the Arab League [or] against the African Union and try to block this
kind of action.
And the Arab League has not done the same in Syria?
Recently,
the Arab League made some statements (Telegraph) about Syria, condemning the
violence against peaceful protestors, but it took a while before they came to
that position. The Human Rights Council has recently come out with a resolution
on Syria; the Security Council in early August added a sharply worded
presidential statement and is now debating various possible resolutions. So,
the international community is moving on Syria, but it's moving somewhat more
slowly than it did on Libya. But in both cases, the secretary-general from the
very beginning has been very consistent and very vocal, because he is really
recognizing the need for the Secretariat side to be consistent and to avoid any
selectivity in terms of how this principle of R2P" is applied.
In
Libya, the turning point came when the Security Council called for use of force
to protect civilians, which led to NATO's aerial intervention, which was a
major factor in bringing down Qaddafi.
The
first resolution from the Security Council called for sanctions and for
referral to the International Criminal Court. People hoped those measures would
work, but Qaddafi kept moving. It looked like there was about to be a bloodbath
in Benghazi. I can imagine what people would be saying about the responsibility
to protect, if there was no reaction to that and we ended up with a bloodbath.
How do you think the situation will resolve itself in Syria?
It's
hard to know. One obviously wants a peaceful outcome. One wants the government
to come to its senses vis-à-vis its international obligation for human rights
and atrocity prevention. It's been very slow to do so. I think one hopes that
there are internal political processes within Syria that will lead to a changing
attitude, and we noticed that many countries in the region are hardening their
attitude and putting more pressure on the Syrian government to act. Syria
doesn't have as many friends as it did in the beginning. And we hope that will
convince them to change course.
I
wouldn't be recommending a military action, but our position is to pursue the
principle, not to try to micromanage how the Security Council would decide to
use the various tools at its disposable.
This commentary was published in Council On Foreign Affairs CFR
blog on 01/09/2011
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